

# Higher Educational Cost-Sharing, Dual-Track Tuition Fees, and Higher Educational Access: The East African Experience\*

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## I. Introduction

Public systems of higher education worldwide are caught between increasing public and private demand for their products, rising per-student costs, and flat or even declining governmental revenues. The public demand emerges from the increasing recognition of higher education as a major engine of national economic growth and provider of individual opportunity and prosperity. The private demand, or enrollment pressure—especially in Africa and other developing countries—begins in many countries with the sheer demographic increase in the traditional tertiary education age cohort, compounded by the increasing secondary school completion rates, which in turn increase the number of secondary school completers wanting to go on to higher education, further compounded by an expansion of what may be considered a college-going age cohort to include adults formerly by-passed by the system. The flat or declining governmental revenue—again, especially in most of Sub Saharan Africa and other very low-income parts of the world—emerges from the sheer poverty that not only leaves little wealth to be taxed, but that also raises the opportunity costs of all public expenditures, which must compete with public sector needs such as elementary and secondary education, public health, public infrastructure, and other socially as well as politically compelling needs.

This is the social, political, and economic background of one of the most intractable challenges faced by higher education systems the world over: the challenge of reconciling the largely irreconcilable goals of expanding, on the one hand, both the capacity and the quality of higher education (both of which goals imply substantial additional revenue) with, on the other hand, the goal of increasing participation and the equity of that participation (which also implies additional revenue) all within the increasingly pervasive context of decreasing governmental investment in higher education.

In response, most counties have turned to forms of private revenue supplementation for the support of their expanding higher educational needs—the most important of which is *cost-sharing*, or the shift in higher educational costs from being borne mainly or even entirely by governments, or taxpayers, to being shared by governments, parents and students (Johnstone 1986, 2003, 2004a). And the most important of these supplementary revenue streams, while not without problems and political resistance, are *tuition fees* paid for by parents (or larger extended families) and students themselves, mainly deferred, or borrowed.

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In Africa, donor-backed policies in the 1980s and 1990s de-emphasizing public expenditures on higher education relative to expenditure on elementary, middle, and secondary education, contributed to a sometimes temporary, and sometimes not so temporary, re-allocation of resources away from higher education and reinforced the call for more sharing of the costs of instruction by the students and families who benefit from it (World Bank, 1994; Ziderman & Albrecht 1995). Donor pressure contributed to the capping in 1991 of Kenyan public university enrollments at 10,000 students per year with an annual growth rate of no more than 3 percent per year up to 2017 (Kiamba, 2004), to the 17 percent reduction in government spending at Makerere University in 1991 (Ssebuwufu, 2003), and to decreases in government financial support to higher education in Tanzania in the late 1980s (Ishengoma, 2004).

A particular form of tuition fee policy that we have labeled *dual track* appears to achieve some real revenue supplementation, but with problematic impacts on equality (Marcucci & Johnstone, 2005). Dual track tuition policies are characterized by a highly restricted, “merit-based” entry to free or very low cost higher education, with other applicants not so admitted permitted entry on a fee-paying basis. The origin of such a plan seems to lie in former Communist countries, in which free higher education was not only an expectation, frequently enshrined in a constitution or higher education framework law, but also where the country simply did not have sufficient tax revenue to accommodate all of the qualified applicants.<sup>1</sup> The dual-track concept is especially popular in countries where strong resistance to tuition fees is to be expected, but where the sheer difficulty of taxation<sup>2</sup> combines with a particularly daunting queue of competing public sector needs, thus raising the opportunity costs of additional investment in higher education and raising the stakes on the quest for politically acceptable forms of revenue diversification.

Russia, for example, employs such a policy, supporting the pretense of free higher education, yet as many as 50 percent of Russian university students are admitted as fee-payers (Bain, 2001). Most of the other countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as most of the former Socialist Bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe do likewise (Mateju & Simonova, 2003). China employed such a policy until 1997, when it abandoned all pretence of free higher education and instituted a nearly universal expectation of a tuition fee (Li & Min, 2000). In similar fashion, countries in Africa, both from their European colonial legacies and from the strong tradition of African Socialism, are politically and sometimes legally obligated to provide free or nearly free higher education—but without the revenue means to do so (Sawyer, 2002; Johnstone, 2004b).

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<sup>1</sup> Taxes were relatively easy to collect in centrally controlled economies such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe before the collapse of Communism, when purchasing power could be siphoned off at each level of the state-owned production processes via “turnover,” or other forms of value-added taxes. The state could also control—and thus tax—all international trade. Privatization and globalization have essentially eliminated these largely invisible and easy-to-collect taxes, and the alternatives—e.g., taxes on income, retail sales, property, and the sales of luxury goods—are visible, unpopular, expensive, relatively easy to avoid, and technically (in addition to politically) difficult to collect.

<sup>2</sup> Not only are taxes difficult to collect, especially in developing and transitional countries, but the marginal net revenue – after the increasing costs of collection and the higher levels of escape and avoidance – begins to decline as the level of regressivity likely increases.

This paper is about a particular type of dual track tuition in East Africa—Kenya, Uganda, and, until recently, Tanzania—and preliminary results from a study of East African tuition and access conducted by The University at Buffalo’s International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project. The “poster country” for dual-track tuition fees in Sub Saharan Africa has been Uganda, where higher education remains nominally free, but where as much as 80 percent of Makerere University’s 22,000 students pay an average yearly tuition fee of \$700 (Court, 1999; Ssebuwufu, 2003). Kenya (Kiamba, 2004) and Tanzania (Ishengoma, 2004) have other versions of a dual track tuition policy.

Dual track tuition policies differ from other dimensions on which tuition fees throughout the world may vary, such as on the underlying institutional expense, the market draw of a particular program, or some characteristic (gender, ethnicity, residence or socio-economic status) of the student or the family, which can be used as bases for differing tuition rates, or tracks (Marcucci & Johnstone, 2005). The dual track policies referred to here are those based on the need of the government or the institution to severely ration a limited number places that are free (or nearly free) for political or legal reasons, generally using a single examination, while allowing another tuition fee paying track or tracks for the desperately needed revenue supplementation.

An obvious question raised by such policies is their impact on equity. Because entrance to the limited number of “free” places is by highly competitive examination, conventional academic wisdom would assume that the children of the well-educated and the privileged, with their access to the best secondary schools and all of the other advantages of their family cultural capital, would be disproportionately represented—even though these parents would almost certainly pay some tuition fees if necessary. The latter assertion is based in part on the rapid growth of tuition fee dependent private higher education as well as the popularity of the dual track options in all of these countries. The research undertaken by the Buffalo Project explores such questions as:

- What are the difference in e.g. socio-economic, geographical, and secondary school background between those who receive the free (or lower cost) places, and those who must pay fees?
- How well do the cut-off examinations predict academic success? (That is, how do the governmentally-supported students fare academically compared to the privately-supported students?)
- For those that are fee-paying, where does the money for the tuition fee come from?
- What is the profile of qualified students that decide not to opt for the fee-paying places? What do they do instead (e.g. start working, go to a private higher education institution or technical school, try the exam the next year)?
- What is the money that is raised used for (i.e. salaries, increases in number of faculty, expanded capacity, filling in for further reductions in tax revenue)?

This research was undertaken by the University at Buffalo’s International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project Team with the cooperation of the then Vice Chancellor of the University of Nairobi (now Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Science and Technology) and the Ford Foundation Office in Nairobi. Participating scholars include a current Kenyan Ph.D. student at the University

at Buffalo, a recent SUNY Buffalo Ph.D. now back in Tanzania and a recent Stanford Ph.D. student from West Africa (the latter two having written dissertations on cost-sharing in Tanzania and Uganda respectively), and a faculty scholar “on the ground” at Kenyatta University. The research methodology includes review of policy documents and research studies, a research consultation in Nairobi and surveys of students from the University of Dar es Salaam, Makerere University, The Universities of Nairobi and Kenyatta, and other universities (see annex 1 for full methodology description).

It must be noted that as of the summer of 2005, Tanzania has moved from a rather tentative dual track tuition policy, wherein most students were entitled to free higher education, a moderate tuition fee was charged to the self sponsored students and modest fees were charged for food and lodging to a policy in which all students pay a significant tuition fee, all tuition fees are deferred – as loans, and all food and lodging costs are deferred – also as loans. The effective cost sharing of this move depends on the present value of reasonably anticipated repayments, which at this time seem likely to be very low. Some preliminary observations about this new policy will be made in section II.3.

## **II. Dual Track Tuition Policies in East Africa**

Following independence in the three countries, university students were entitled to free room and board, free tuition and spending money (with the exception of Tanzania where bursaries were only introduced in 1967). One of the rationales for such support was the expectation that most students would join their country’s civil service after graduation to replace the departing colonial administrators. Political concerns may also have been behind such policies and leaders may have simply been looking for a place to park the potentially restive politically charged, educated university-aged cohort.

Therefore, government investment in education was highly skewed towards higher education. This situation began to change in late 1980s when governments with the explicit encouragement of donors started to emphasize the importance of primary and secondary schooling for economic development and freeze or even decrease their relative investment in higher education. In Sub-Saharan Africa public current spending on higher education as a percentage of total public current spending on education decreased from 19 to 16.7 percent between 1985 and 1995 and tertiary education expenditure per student decreased from 802 percent of GNP per capita to 422 percent (Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000: 123). Whereas 17 per cent of the World Bank’s worldwide education-sector spending was on higher education between 1985 and 1989, ten years later the proportion had declined to 7 percent (Bloom, Canning & Chan, 2005).<sup>3</sup> Moreover, these changes were taking place in a context of dramatically increased demand for higher education due to demographic growth and increased rates of secondary school participation.

Governments and university leaders in East Africa introduced dual track tuition policies in order to expand higher educational capacity (and hopefully quality) despite these challenges without introducing politically unpopular tuition fees to all students and families. Dual track tuition, at least by the definition of the University at Buffalo’s

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<sup>3</sup> By the end of the 1990s this trend was again changing and the critical role of higher education for economic development was again being examined by African governments and international donors including the World Bank.

ICHEFA Project, means that only some students, based on some criteria of academic merit, are paying very low, or no tuition fees whereas other students, presumably qualified for university admission but falling below the cut-off point entitling them to the free or very low tuition, pay a substantial tuition fee (generally at or very close to the full marginal cost of instruction). The purpose of a dual track tuition fee policy is to retain some level of free or very low-cost higher education for at least some students – presumably for legal or political reasons – but also to be able to supplement the government’s scarce public revenue with private revenue from families who are willing and able to pay.

In all three East African countries, the cut-off points for sponsored admissions are set based on government estimates of the number of students that they are able to support. Particularly in Kenya and Uganda, it is rapidly becoming more accurate to think of the university financing system as one in which most students have to pay tuition fees, while only a few academically excellent students receive government sponsorship (Carrol, 2004: 17).

## **II.1 Dual Track Tuition Policy in Uganda**

The dual track policy was introduced in Uganda at Makerere University via the Private Entry Scheme (PES) in 1992 and later extended to all Uganda public universities. Under the scheme, government-sponsored students do not have to pay tuition and they receive what in many African countries had been long considered a standard student entitlement: free room and board. The public universities run two different admission processes. The first, conducted by the Public Universities Joint Admissions Board (PUJAB), selects those students who will be awarded government scholarships (publicly sponsored students) based on the number of students that the Government of Uganda (GOU) decides to sponsor. That number currently stands at about 4,000. Before the admissions process, all faculties within the universities provide information on the number of students that they can accommodate and decide on the distribution of government-sponsored and privately sponsored students.

All students who wish to be considered for admission under government sponsorship to public universities are required to fill out the PUJAB application form. Students are asked to rank their top 6 choices of degree programs at public universities and 4 choices of diploma programs at other public tertiary institutions. Needy students, in particular, pay close attention to their choices, since some programs are much more competitive (with higher cut-off points) than others. The minimum qualification for entry into Makerere and other public universities is 2 principal passes at the Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education Examination (UACE). However, to earn a government scholarship, students need to be outstanding. Most students will sit for either three or four subjects in their area of study (arts or sciences). Their scores on the various subjects are then weighted based on the requirement of individual programs within faculties, and the top-scoring students are admitted.

There is no pre-determined cut off point that determines admission. The cut-off point for admission into each program is determined by the lowest score of the last person accepted into that program. For example, if the Faculty of Law decides to take only 50 government-sponsored students, it ranks the applicants according to their

weighted scores, and takes the top 50. The weighted score of the 50th student becomes the cut-off point for Law for that year. Very popular programs like Medicine, Dentistry, and Architecture have high cutoff points, whereas the less popular such as Law, Mass Communication, and Social Work and Social Administration have lower cut-offs. Affirmative action policies, which add additional 1.5-4 points to a student's scores, are in place for women, applicants with disability, talented athletes, and the biological children of Makerere employees (Carrol, 2004).

The second admissions process, for private admission, happens after the PUJAB admissions. Students who do not get a government scholarship are invited to put in applications under the private entry scheme (PES). There are a few students who get government scholarships for a program that was not their first choice, but who reapply under PES. The private admission selection process is similar to the PUJAB process, and public universities do the admissions jointly. At Makerere, where programs are offered during the day and evenings, the higher performing students are put in the day programs, where they study together with the publicly sponsored students.

There are no legal limitations on the number of privately sponsored students that are allowed in the institutions, but the government-sponsored students have first priority. Faculties differ in the proportion of private students that they accept. In Forestry, for example, 13 percent of the students are self sponsored, while in the Institute of Psychology, 90 percent are. There are many reasons for the differences having to do with both supply and demand side constraints. However, the Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions Act (The Act) of 2001 does give the Board of an academic unit the power to regulate the admissions of students subject to the approval of the academic senate (Carrol, 2004).

The level of tuition fees for the private entry scheme students are set by the faculty subject to approval by the Academic Senate and the University Council. Fee levels vary and science faculties tend to charge more than humanities faculties. Tuition fees average about 1,800,000 Ush (US\$994) per year<sup>4</sup>. Tuition increases are generally difficult to get passed by the University Council due to the government representatives who usually block such increases (Carrol, 2004).

Dual track tuition policies have greatly expanded capacity as illustrated by the dramatic increase in enrollment at Makerere University between 1992 and 2002 that grew from 5,000 to over 30,000 students and by the growth in total public universities enrollments that reached 46,819 in 2004 (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2005). As of 2002, about 80 percent of the student body at Makerere was made up of privately sponsored students (Carrol, 2004). However, survey data (Carrol, 2004) suggests that the dual track tuition policies do not increase the access of traditionally underrepresented groups in the absence of student financial assistance programs such as means tested grants and student loan programs and that, in fact, the private entry scheme may even reinforce existing inequities in participation at the university. There is little socio-economic difference between the government and the privately sponsored students, with both coming from relatively affluent families. It is interesting to note, however, that the two types of students do differ in other ways: the publicly sponsored students appear to

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<sup>4</sup> US\$1=Ush 1,810.3

come from families who are part of the traditional elite (educated professional class) and to have been educated in the elite government owned boarding schools, while a greater proportion of the privately sponsored students appear to come from families whose economic well being stems from entrepreneurial endeavors (Carrol, 2004) and to have been educated at private and communal secondary schools. In the absence of a student loan program, enrollments are limited to those students whose families can afford to finance all the related costs of higher education.

While the students and faculty in Uganda seem to know who is privately sponsored due to student identification numbers, there does not appear to be great differences in the way that they are perceived or treated or in the students' attitudes toward each other.

Some students who do not qualify for government sponsorship apply to a private university or diploma granting institution or go abroad rather than opting for the fee-paying places. Others who cannot afford the self-paying options try to raise money for admission at a later time or repeat S6 hoping to qualify for government sponsorship the next year. Many opt to start working instead.

All students whether fee paying or governmentally sponsored have multiple sources of money. Over 30 percent receive financial support from siblings, 12 percent receive support from extended families, 27 percent contribute to their own expenses by working, and yet others receive funding from friends and other acquaintances (Carrol, 2004).

Makerere University has generated large amounts of revenue from the private entry scheme: increasing from 4,080,059,201 Ugandan Shillings (US\$3,831,000) in 1995/96 to 29,438,099,000 shillings (US\$16,510,000) in 2002/03.<sup>5</sup> As shown in Table 1, by 2003, over half of university funding was coming from the PES. It must be noted, however, that the revenues generated are not uniform over academic units. Some academic units that admit large numbers of private students have been able to raise significant amounts of revenue, whereas other units have not been as successful.

**Table 1**  
**Privately generated funding at Makerere University, 1995-2003 (US\$)**

Year	Private Funding	Total Funding	% Private
1995/96	4,080,059,201	24,408,492,201	17
1996/97	7,561,493,114	26,816,801,848	28
1997/98	8,799,261,213	28,299,261,213	31
1998/99	13,663,196,178	36,205,134,178	38
1999/00	15,080,261,764	38,070,261,764	40
2000/01	17,406,254,325	39,466,254,325	44
2001/02	19,030,439,000	45,680,439,000	42
2002/03	29,438,099,000	55,698,099,000	53

Source: Makerere University, Finance Department in Carrol, 2004

The Bursar's office collects the tuition and fees, retains part of it and send the remainder to the income generating units (faculties and institutes.) The distribution

<sup>5</sup> 1995/96 exchange rates \$1 = 1,065Ush and 2002/03 \$1 = 1,783 Ush.

amounts are set by the University Council and vary with the type of program (day, evening, etc.). The university uses the centrally held money for university-wide activities, such as supplementing staff salaries, supplying staff development, and sponsoring research, etc. Each faculty has some discretion over how it spends its own income subject to approval by the University Council with over 90 percent of it going to recurrent expenditures and salaries (Carrol, 2004).

## II.2 Dual Track Tuition Policy in Kenya

Very modest tuition fees were introduced in public universities in Kenya in 1991, but the generated resources were insufficient given the severely limited number of students. The Makerere model was introduced in 1998 via the self-sponsored, or Module II, programs.

The assumed average cost of each degree program is Ksh 120,000 (US\$1,534<sup>6</sup>) per year of which the government covers Ksh 70,000 (US\$895) for the sponsored students (module I) leaving the remaining Ksh 50,000 (US\$639) to the student to raise from the Kenyan Higher Education Loan board (HELB) or private sources. Governmentally sponsored students are entitled to a means-tested HELB loan that at best (and only for the poorest students) covers up to three quarters of educational and living costs for the year (maximum loan of Ksh 42,000 and maximum bursary of Ksh 8,000) (Otieno, 2004). HELB loans carry a 4 percent rate of interest and are repayable starting one year after completion of studies.

Students who attain the prescribed cut off point (COP) are admitted into the regular state supported programs by the Joints Admissions Board (JAB), a non-statutory body made up of the Vice Chancellors, Deputy Vice Chancellors, Principals and Deans of the six public universities and representatives from the Ministry of Education. In principle, Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) holders with C+ and above qualify for public university admission; however, this cut off point depends on the total public university student capacity of about 10,000 students. Therefore, the JAB sets the entry cut off for government-sponsored students from year to year. If a greater proportion of the students have high passes in a particular year, the cut off will be higher and vice versa. For example, the cut off for admission in 2005 admission was 64 points higher than in 2004.

Non-JAB students who are admitted on a self-paying basis gain entry to universities on the basis of different criteria that vary from university to university. At the very initial stages of the module II programs, candidates had to be *Form Four* school leavers who met the minimum entry requirement of C+ but could not meet the entry cut off point for government sponsorship. In an attempt to increase the number of self-sponsored students, various institutions made admission conditions more flexible and accepted students from different academic backgrounds including holders of A level certificates, Kenya Advanced Certificate of Education (KACE) from the old 7-4-2-3 system, P1 holders, diploma holders, and certificate holders from other governmentally-recognized institutions. Even the conditions for admission into postgraduate programs have since been eased to allow holders of pass/lower second class qualifications to enroll

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<sup>6</sup> 2004 exchange rate US\$1 = 78.194 Ksh.

in masters programs provided they have a given number of years experience in a profession relevant to the area of study (Otieno, 2004).

It is important to note there are JAB students who turn down their places in the module I programs and enroll into the self-paying program because they wish to finish their studies sooner (given the fact that all students enrolling in public universities are required to wait one year after they complete high school because of university capacity constraints) or because they were placed in academic programs that they have no desire to pursue. Enrolling in the module II programs, therefore, offers students a chance to complete their education sooner than those individuals enrolled in the module I program and also enables them to pursue the courses they desire.

When the first KCSE students were admitted into the public universities in the early 1990s, the cut-off point for government sponsorship was placed at a grade C (59 points), but a student's admission was pegged on his/her performance in individual critical subjects. By 1992, the cut-off point had risen to a minimum of grade B-. When the number of examinable subjects was reduced from ten to eight in 1993, the cut-off point remained at B-. During the intake for the 1994 KCSE candidates, the minimum entry cut-off point was placed at a grade B- (63 points). The basic cut-off score is required to qualify for government sponsorship, but for a student to enroll in his chosen field, he/she must also meet the subject cluster cut-off for the specific program. Between 1990 and 1999, the course cluster cut-offs were calculated directly from the sum of the raw scores in each of a number of relevant subjects. Since 1999, the course cluster cut-off was changed to a function called the *weighted cluster cut off*.

In Kenya, tuition fees for privately sponsored students vary between 96,000 Ksh (US\$1,227) for most programs to 450,000 Ksh (US\$5,754) for dental and medical programs<sup>7</sup>.

**Table 2**  
**Kenya: Increases in Enrollments in Public Universities**

Year	Enrollments
1999/2000	41,760
2000/2001	42,346
2001/2002	54,543
2002/2003	59,593
2003/2004	58,016

Sources: Kenyan Ministry of Education,  
Science and Technology

In Kenya, the module II programs have been expanding since 1998 and have contributed to increased enrollments in public universities (Tables 2 & 3). Almost half of all students at the University of Nairobi are enrolled in these programs. In 2002/03 about 40 percent of all public university students were in the Module II programs (Table 3).

<sup>7</sup> 2004 exchange rate US\$1=78.194Ksh

**Table 3**  
**Enrollment in Public Universities in Kenya By Track (2002/03)**

University	Enrolments		
	Regular	Module II	Total
UoN**	11,090	10,902	21,992
Moi	6,800	3,174	9,974
Kenyatta	7,200	8,856	16,056
Egerton	7,500	1,097	8,597
JKUAT	3,200	3,074	6,674
Maseno	4,300	1,231	5,531
WEUCST	700	-	700
Total	40,790	28,334	69,124

\*UoN figures from Kiamba (2003) for 2002/2003 Academic Year (AY), while rest of figures apply for 2003/2004 AYs. Source: HELB – courtesy of Public Universities. (Otieno 2004)

Survey data suggest that while students in both the module I and module II programs come from the better off segments of society, a significantly greater proportion of the students in the module II programs come from the richer segments of society and are concentrated in high and middle income families (89 percent) compared to students in the module I programs (68 percent) (Otieno, 2005).

These findings may be due to the fact that in the past the student loan program was available only to needy government-sponsored students in the module I programs and students who attended private universities. Therefore, all privately sponsored students had to cover both their tuition fees and living costs without recourse to a subsidized student loan. However, in 2005, with the aim of increasing equity in higher education, the Higher Education Loans Board negotiated with two commercial banks – National Bank of Kenya and the Cooperative Bank of Kenya to lend money to students who had been admitted into universities locally, including the students who are enrolled in the module II program. Once the students' places have been confirmed by the universities, the banks pay from Kshs.50,000 to Kshs.500,000 directly to the universities depending on the tuition costs of each academic program. The commercial bank loans have higher interest rates (between 14 and 15 percent) than the government loan (4 percent). It is not yet clear how much the enrollments have increased as a result of commercial bank lending to students.

In Kenya, there is definite tension between the module I and module II students. The government sponsored students view the self-sponsored students as unqualified and only being allowed to study because they can afford to pay. Students argue that facilities are not adequate to accommodate such a large number of fee-paying students (Otieno, 2004).

Both the module I and module II students get a significant amount of money from their families: 87 percent of the module II students and 78 percent of the module I students reported that resources from their families were critical in allowing them to go to university (Otieno, 2004).

In Kenya, the importance of the module II programs as revenue earners has been growing since their introduction. In 1998-98, the module II programs at the University of Nairobi generated about 4 percent of its total income, by 2002-03, this had grown to one-third (Kiamba, 2004). In 2002/03 academic year alone, the University of Nairobi earned a total of US\$17,551,873 through its parallel programs and by the end of that year, income from students and parents (including both module I and II) contributed close to 40 percent of the total university income (Otieno, 2004). In turn, the government allocation dropped from 70 percent of the university's income in 1995/96 to 49 percent in 2002/03 (Kiamba, 2004).

**Table 4**  
**Income Earned from the Various Income-Generating Activities through UNES, 1997-2002 (Kshs.)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Module II Programs</b>	<b>Other Projects</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>1997/98</b>	12,964,110	66,696,046	79,660,156
<b>1998/99</b>	233,153,499	82,001,499	315,154,998
<b>1999/2000</b>	377,144,631	84,160,615	461,305,246
<b>2000/2001</b>	602,836,675	78,166,941	681,003,616
<b>2001/2002</b>	944,096,451	73,359,334	1,017,455,785
<b>2002/2003</b>	1,209,512,592	106,877,915	1,316,390,507
<b>Grand Total</b>			2,870,970,308

Source: University of Nairobi (2003) in Kiamba (2004)

The income from the Kenyan parallel programs is used for institutional development and payment of academic and administrative staff. Generally, 35 percent of the raised funds are used to pay the lecturers, while 65 percent goes to the university. Funds are used for improved teaching materials and building projects. The University of Nairobi is reported to have spent well over 520 million shillings on renovation and completion of stalled building projects using money from the module II programs.

### **II.3 Dual Track Tuition Policy in Tanzania**

In Tanzania, while foreign and institutionally supported students started to be admitted on a fee-paying basis in the early 1980s, the explicit dual track tuition policy was introduced in a context in which cost sharing was already underway in higher education. In 1992, students (and families) became responsible for paying for their own transportation, application, registration, entry exam and student union fees as well as caution money and in 1993 student allowances were eliminated. In 1996, the University of Dar es Salaam's Council approved an official proposal for admitting privately sponsored Tanzanian students and in 2002, it officially recommended that the university fill remaining spots not filled with government sponsored students (who did not have to pay tuition fees) with privately sponsored, tuition fee paying students. In the same year, it voted to give the sons, daughters and spouses of university staff and members of the University Council the right to pay only half of the tuition fees (Ishengoma, 2004).

The dual track tuition policy in Tanzania was essentially discontinued when the government introduced student loans (July 2005) for the 2005-06 academic year to cover tuition fees, other academic fees, room and board for all higher education students

whether government or privately sponsored in the public universities or self paying in the private universities.<sup>8</sup> This student loan policy dramatically changed the country's tuition policy, moving it from a dual track policy to one in which all students must pay tuition, albeit deferred as a loan to be repaid once they have finished their studies.

In Tanzania, under its previous dual track policy, the University of Dar es Salaam would establish criteria and set minimum cut-off points for admission in the individual degree programs, based on the number of students that the government set for admittance under its sponsorship. Unlike the policies in Kenya and Uganda, the government also determined the distribution of students among campuses and programs. In 2003-04, for example, the government issued a directive saying that it would sponsor 2,555 students of which 400 must be in the arts program, 200 in the arts education program, 260 in the education program, 290 in the commerce program, 315 in the engineering program, 420 in the science program, 250 in the doctor of medicine program and 250 in the University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (Ishengoma, 2004).

Admission to the government-sponsored places was based on pass mark achievement on the Advanced Certificate of Secondary Education Examinations (ACSEE). The minimum entry cut-off points set by the University of Dar es Salaam varied from 6.5 to 10.5 points depending on the degree programs with female applicants having a slightly lower cut-off point to make up for past discrimination. A limited number of non-traditional students entered public universities through Mature Age Entry Examinations and through distance learning conducted by the Open University of Tanzania that operates in all 25 regions of Tanzania Mainland.

Admission to the self-sponsored places was also based on results of the ACSEE exam. Candidates had to receive principal level passes in appropriate subjects with a total of at least 5 points from three subjects obtained at the same sitting. Like in the other two countries, the different programs had additional admission criteria. Tuition fees for the privately sponsored students ranged between Tsh 600,000 (US\$550) and 1,000,000 (US\$917) for medicine and law<sup>9</sup>.

In Tanzania, while there has been a significant increase in undergraduate enrollments in the past 10 years (see Table 2), with the University of Dar es Salaam alone growing from 3,146 students in 1993/94 to 14,221 students in 2003/04 (Bloom et. al., 2005), only a small part of this growth has been in self sponsored students<sup>10</sup> despite increased applications and increases in the number of secondary school leavers (Ishengoma, 2004). As part of the dismantling of the dual track tuition policy, the University of Dar es Salaam encouraged privately sponsored students to switch to government-sponsored places via a public announcement on their website, as long as they have a good reason. Given the movement from a dual track tuition policy to general tuition (albeit deferred) for all, it was not possible for the recent research to gather

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<sup>8</sup> Reasons for which may include student pressure through violent strikes and the multi-party General Elections of December 2005 (Ishengoma 2006). The Higher Education Student Loans Board was established under Parliamentary Act No. 9 of 2004 and began operations in July 2005. Prior to that the student loans scheme was handled by a unit in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education.

<sup>9</sup> 2004 exchange rate: \$1 =1,089.33Tsh

<sup>10</sup> While the number of privately sponsored students grew from 106 in 1992-93 to 289 in 2001-2002, it remained at about 3 percent of total enrollments throughout the period (Ishengoma, 2004).

information on the socio-economic background of the self-sponsored students. However, it was observed that in general in Tanzania students from better off families disproportionately undertake higher education (Johnstone, 2004). It will be important to track the impact of the new tuition policy and loan program on the socio-economic composition of the student body.

**Table 5**  
**Tanzania: Undergraduate Enrollments in Public Universities**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Enrollments</b>
1995/1996	8,350
1996/1997	9,370
1997/1998	10,773
1998/1999	12,069
1999/2000	12,665
2000/2001	13,987
2001/2002	15,047

Sources: Ishengoma, 2004

In Tanzania, at present (2005-06 academic year)<sup>11</sup>, student loans cover tuition up to TZS 1,500,000 (US\$1,329) for humanities and social science courses and TZS 2,000,000 (US\$1,770) for science and technology related courses; TZS 2,500 (US\$2.21) per day for meals and accommodations; TZS 120,000 (US\$106) for books and stationary per academic year; variable for specific faculty requirement; TZS 100,000 (US\$88) for research; and TZS 6,000 (US\$5.30) per day for practical training. The recent research in Tanzania revealed that of the 86 students interviewed at the University of Dar es Salaam, 78 received government student loans (Ishengoma, 2006). Those who do not get student loans blamed their failure to get loans on their inability to meet cosignatory conditions (Ishengoma, 2006). Students supplement this with money from parent and family members and less frequently, with money they have earned.

Given that enrollment in dual track tuition programs was very low, relatively little additional income was generated. Between 1995 and 2000, only 1,727,015,842 Tsh (US\$1,583,393<sup>12</sup>) was raised in private tuition (Ishengoma, 2004). The generated income was largely used to top up the salaries of the faculty who taught courses in the dual track program (Ishengoma 2004). The new policy would seem to be a significant increase in cost sharing, but only if the new tuition fees are recovered -- while recovery at this time (and with limited information) seems problematic for the following reasons:

- May not be clear to student that there even is a legally-enforceable obligation to repay.

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<sup>11</sup> New guidelines released by the Board on May 31, 2006 will change some of the loan allocations: up to sixty percent of tuition fees; up to TZS120,000 (US\$106) for books and stationary per academic year; up to 60 percent of special faculty requirements; 60 percent of recommended field practical work expenses and up to 100 percent of recommended research expenses in selected fields.

<sup>12</sup> 2004 exchange rates: \$1 =1,089.33 Tsh

- There seems to be no requirement for repayment arrangements to be made before leaving the university.
- Not clear that there is a collection agency with staff and existing procedures for recording deferred obligations and the technical capacity to keep track of them, legal enforcement powers, etc.
- Not clear that a deferred obligation is the same as a loan.
- Not clear what the interest rate is ... or the repayment period ... or what the legal sanctions are for non-payment;
- No apparent effort to make employers, or the tax system assist in the collections

**Table 6**  
**Income Generated from Private Tuition Compared to Government Investment at the University of Dar es Salaam**

Year	Private Tuition	Total Income	Private tuition as % of total
1995	41,898,950	4,585,030,348	0.9
1996	78,285,199	6,582,493,050	1.2
1997	327,407,317	7,959,722,061	4.1
1998	393,755,289	7,155,431,989	5.5
1999	273,691,653	9,545,694,105	2.8
2000	611,977,434	11,163,220,908	5.4
Total	1,727,015,843 US\$3,795,138	46,991,592,460 US\$103,264,607	3.6

Source: Ishengoma 2004

### **III. East African Dual Track Tuition Policies and the Equity of Higher Educational Access**

The theoretical relationship between a dual track tuition policy and the equity of higher educational participation—defined as the degree to which higher educational participation is correlated with socioeconomic class (or ethnicity, gender, language or region)—is complex and depends on three interrelated factors:

*The total additional revenue made available to the higher educational system by virtue of the dual track tuition fee policy:* that is, the degree to which the revenue from the dual track tuition fee payers can be captured by the higher educational system as opposed to merely enabling governmental budget cuts (or going into other wasteful or corrupt expenditures). Clearly, for a dual track policy to lessen rather than to aggravate participation disparities, there first has to be some net additional revenue. In the East African context, the additional revenue was retained by the institutions and contributed to improvements in facilities, additional staff and better staff morale through higher salaries.

*The additional higher educational capacity made possible by the additional revenue:* The greatest contributor to inequitable participation is arguably the lack of capacity and the resulting need for stringent selection. As long as the current system of selection yields a disproportionately middle and upper income student population—which is inevitable in any system of selection based mainly on measures of academic preparedness or even academic ambition—virtually any increase in capacity is likely to lead to at least a slight increase in the equity of higher educational participation. (That is, the sons and daughters of the wealthy can be assumed to have previously been “taken care of,” if not by the limited governmentally-sponsored places, then by the private sector or by being sent abroad for their higher education.) In the three countries of East Africa, and particularly in Uganda and Kenya, university capacity grew significantly as a result of the dual track tuition policy, what changed little was the socio-economic background of the students.

*The provision of additional student financial assistance—in the form of means-tested grants or student loans—to low income students who are qualified, but only for the dual track entry that is made possible by the additional revenue:* Some of the additional revenue, in addition to making possible the necessary increased capacity referenced above, must make it more possible for the government to provide additional assistance that increases the participation of students of students who would now—by virtue of the additional capacity—be included, but who would likely be unable to participate because of the low incomes of their families. (A controversial point is the degree to which low income students require grants or very heavily subsidized loans in order to be given sufficient access, or whether the availability of minimally subsidized loans should enable the sufficient access. Governmental action as well as public revenue is required in either case, but the level of expenditure can, at least in theory, vary considerably.) There is no evidence in any of the countries that the additional revenue generated by the dual track tuition policies was used to address equity concerns.

#### **IV. Some Conclusions on the Success of the Policies in Expanding Capacity and Quality, and Increasing Participation and Equity**

While all of the research has not yet been reported and analyzed, the following represent our preliminary conclusions:

1. The dual track tuition policy has had an extraordinarily beneficial effect on the financial viability certainly of Makerere and Nairobi, and it is presumed also to have had a somewhat positive impact on the university of Dar es Salaam, Kenyatta University, and other higher educational institutions where it has been introduced.
2. Cost sharing in Tanzania has a beneficial potential, but this depends on whether the deferred tuition fees – in effect, loans by the government to the student – get to the universities, or merely remain as “receivables,” or assets of some doubtful value on the government’s books. For the government to be able to convert these “deferred obligations,” or “loan collectibles” to revenue of use to the universities, it must either wait to see what repayments it gets back or sell them at a considerable discount.
3. The willingness of parents (and extended families and others) to contribute toward the higher education of those who are attending on a fee-paying basis is a

strong indicator that many of those now being admitted to the universities on governmental sponsorship, or the tuition free basis, would pay a modest tuition fee.

4. Although there is increased capacity and increased institutional financial viability made possible by the additional revenue streams from the privately-sponsored students, there are currently no figures that illuminate whether there has been significant increase in accessibility for the poorer segments of the population. In Kenya, the Module II program expanded capacity, but only for middle-income students and certainly not for genuinely poor students due to the absence of means-tested loans available to privately sponsored students. With the introduction of loans in Kenya in 2005 for privately sponsored students at a significantly higher interest rate, it will be important to examine whether equity is improved.
5. Efforts should be made to implement a student loan program in Uganda and to significantly strengthen the recently revamped program in Tanzania, drawing on the very many lessons that have been learned by the successful student loan program in Kenya.
6. There is at least an appearance of non-transparency in the criteria for allocating the free, or governmentally sponsored, places, as well as in the criteria for the allocation of loans (among the governmentally-sponsored students) that should be addressed.
7. Too little is known about the academic success of those students who enter on a privately sponsored basis—and especially about the differences between the governmentally- and the privately sponsored students. Research with some empirical evidence is needed to counteract (or validate) assumptions or rumors about the academic worthiness of the fee-paying, or privately sponsored, students.
8. The potentially successful Kenyan Higher Education Loan Scheme should be continued with minimal subsidization and maximum efforts to recover loans in default or arrears, including measures that require employers to deduct repayments from earnings and to freeze the ability of a borrower to leave the country without satisfactory arrangements for handing current and delinquent repayments. Uganda should implement a similarly effective loans scheme—that is, with minimal subsidization and effective collection mechanisms—as an autonomous public corporation. Attention should be given in Tanzania to collection mechanisms and means testing.
9. As soon as a “track record” of collection and loan recovery has been established by the public agency, efforts should be made to securitize the loan notes and thereby to release the government from some of the burden of initial capitalization entirely from its operating budget.<sup>13</sup> As the loan notes become able to be privately capitalized (and thus no longer entirely a drain on the government’s operating

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<sup>13</sup> Politicians should not be seduced into believing that a student loan program can ever become entirely “revolving,” or at a point where originations can be funded simply with repayments. Enrollment growth, inflation, the expense of even minimal subsidization, and the costs of defaults will always require financial contributions from government.

budget), eligibility to borrow should be extended to students in the privately sponsored tracks who cannot attend without some form of financial assistance<sup>14</sup>. Criteria for borrowing should continue to be a combination of academic promise (however measured) and financial need—that is, assuming an expected family contribution.

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<sup>14</sup> Module II students are now eligible to receive a student loans, but at an interest rate of 14 percent.

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## **Annex 1**

### **Research Methodology**

The research methodology includes review of policy documents and research policies, a research consultation in Nairobi and surveys of students from the University of Dar es Salaam, Makerere University, the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University and Moi University as well as an electronically stored database of all recipients of student loans in Kenya.

In August 2004, Bidemi Carol was contracted to support the project with her dissertation research in Uganda on the implications of the higher education private entry scheme for students, their parents, higher education institutions and society. In particular, she was asked to furnish descriptive/factual information on the private entry scheme and its financial consequences and information about the students themselves, their attitudes towards the private funding scheme and the degree to which the scheme influences their decision to attend university. She submitted her research report in December 2004 and participated in the consultative workshop held in Nairobi in January 2005.

In April 2004, Wycliffe Otieno was contracted to support the Center with our research in Kenya on the implications of the higher education private entry scheme for students, their parents, higher education institutions and society. In particular, he was asked to furnish factual information on the private entry scheme and its financial consequences using secondary data sources and informal data collection techniques (i.e. conversations with students and administrators, etc.). He submitted his research report in December 2004 and participated in the consultative workshop help in Nairobi in January 2005.

In April 2005, Dr. Otieno was given a second contract to follow up his earlier research on the implications of higher education private entry scheme for students, their parents, higher education institutions and society by furnishing the Center with information on the students in both module I and module II programs, their attitudes towards the private funding scheme and the degree to which the scheme influences their decision to attend university. As part of his research, he conducted a review of the existing literature and research on student attitudes in Kenya and, if relevant, other parts of Africa to cost sharing, tuition fees and student loans and particularly dual track programs; and carry out qualitative research with students from the University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University and Moi University on their existing attitudes and conditions under which their attitudes towards cost sharing would change.

Johnson Ishengoma, a professor at St. Augustine University in Mwanza, Tanzania and a recent PhD. From the Graduate School of Education, SUNY at Buffalo, participated in the January 2005 workshop in Nairobi and provided valuable background information on the dual track tuition policy in Tanzania that had been the subject of his doctoral dissertation under Dr. Bruce Johnstone. In July 2005, Johnson Ishengoma was contracted to pilot the student survey developed by the ICHEFA project team to a very limited number of students (100 students at St. Augustine University and to 100 students, of which half were to be privately sponsored, at the University of Dar es Salaam) to gather information on student backgrounds, university costs and student attitudes towards cost sharing in general and to the dual track tuition system in particular and to conduct

qualitative interviews with university officials and government policy makers to assess the official and unofficial status of the Tanzanian cost sharing policy and identify plans that are in place for its implementation (or not) in the future.

### **Uganda Research Methodology (Bidemi Carroll)**

Students were chosen using a multi-stage sampling technique. In the first stage, students in the university were divided into clusters based on academic units (faculties), and by discipline (humanities-based and science-based). The proxy measure for extent of privatization was the percentage of total enrolments that were private students. Three faculties were then selected to represent both humanities and science disciplines, and high, medium and low privatization (SCI\_MED, SCI\_LOW, HUM\_HIGH). Students were randomly selected within these faculties.

The characteristics of faculties that were asked to participate are listed in Table 2 below. Faculties SCI\_MED and SCI\_LOW are science-based faculties, with medium (50 percent private students) and low (13 percent private students) privatization.

**Table 2**  
**Characteristics of Faculty Included in the Survey**

Faculties	Total Faculty Enrollments	% Private Students	% Female Students	Average Tuition	Evening Students
HUM_HIGH	6,233	80	56	450,000	Yes
SCI_MED	883	50	18	825,000	No
SCI_LOW	171	13	24	600,000	No

Source: Makerere University Registrar's Office and Makerere University Planning and Development Department Annual Report 2002: A Review of the Institutional Development Plan 2000/02-2004/05 (Kampala, Uganda: New Vision, 2003).

From the list of registered students, 600 students were randomly selected to participate in the survey. Proportional sampling of 21 percent of students from each department was carried out. With permission from the relevant lecturers, students were approached during the class period for a course that was required for their majors. Of the 600 randomly selected students, 434 returned the questionnaires (a 72 percent response rate). Students who were not in class after two visits were replaced with students who were present. An additional 113 surveys were collected from this 'volunteer' group for a total of 567 questionnaires.

### **Kenyan Research Methodology (Wycliffe Otieno)**

The population of interest were sophomores in both MI and MII programmes. The survey was carried out between May and July 2005. MI or regular students referred to those students who were admitted to the public universities through the joint admissions board (JAB). On the other hand, MI, self sponsored or parallel degree students refers mostly to those students who did not meet the cut-off points and are meeting the entire cost of their education. HELB has since worked out a scheme with the National Bank of Kenya to give loans to these students at an interest rate of 14%.

A total of 660 students respondents were targeted from three public universities: Kenyatta (220), University of Nairobi – UoN (220) and Moi (220). It was expected that the 660 students would be distributed equally by gender and programme (Module I (MI) and Module II (MII)). The total number of questionnaires received was 575, representing a response rate of 87%, though it varied by university (Table 1.1). UoN was sampled not only for being the biggest and oldest institutions, but also for being the most centrally located and having the widest range of programmes. Kenyatta was chosen for having the biggest school of education and the most dominant in the provision of school based programmes. On the other hand, Moi was included due to its basically rural, and therefore remote, location, besides having the second widest range of programmes after UoN.

Overall, a total of 261 (46.3%) students were in MII and the remaining 375 were in MI programmes (Table 1.1). It was intended that up to half of the students to be reached would be in MII programmes but this proved difficult, because majority of students are part time and tracking them was not as easy as the on campus regular counterparts.

**Table 1**  
**Distribution of Students by University and Programme Type**

<i>University</i>	<i>Regular/Module 1</i>	<i>SSP/Module 2</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Kenyatta University</b>	51	108	159
<b>University of Nairobi</b>	136	53	189
<b>Moi University</b>	116	100	216
<b>Total</b>	303	261	564

The number of students in Table 1.1 is fewer than the 575 reached because 11 students did not indicate the programme they are enrolled in. A notable feature of Table 1.1 is the fewer number of MII students reached at UoN, though it has the highest number of MII students. It reflects the difficulty encountered by the research team in reaching these students, most of who attend classes in the evenings. A number who were given questionnaires failed to return them, some returned indicating that they did not have enough time, while some flatly refused to participate in the study.

**Table 1.2**  
**Distribution of Students by Gender and University**

<i>University</i>	<i>Gender</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	
<b>Kenyatta University</b>	53	107	160
<b>University of Nairobi</b>	59	139	198
<b>Moi University</b>	103	113	216
<b>Total</b>	215	359	574

Moi University had the highest response rate of 98%, followed by UoN at 88.4% and Kenyatta at 64.3%. Female students comprise 37.4% of respondents reached. At

Moi, the female population is a significant 47.7%, at KU 335 while at UoN, female students constituted 26.8%.

The research was basically done in two locales: Nairobi and Eldoret. The former is home to two of the sampled universities, University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University respectively. Nairobi was chosen for being the capital, more urbanised and has a concentration of all categories of students. Eldoret was chosen for being basically rural. While it is a major town in its own right, the location of Moi University is perhaps the most rural of all public universities in Kenya. It was hoped that this mix of rural and urban settings would yield good comparative data that could enrich the study.

This study used a standardized questionnaire developed under by SUNY-Buffalo's CGSE. There were a few adjustments that took into consideration specific circumstances of university education in Kenya. In the survey a question comprising mostly closed response questions and likert measurement scales for gauging student ratings of various study questions was administered on both parallel and regular degree programmes. Scores in the measurement scales were tallied and used in the data analysis. Field data collected were analysed using SPSS to generate trends of students' responses in relation to their gender, family income levels, study module, university's geographical location or type of degree programme for which the students were enrolled at the university

#### **Tanzanian Research Methodology (Johnson Ishengoma)**

The pilot study covered 193 full time students (94 from the UDSM and 99 from the University of Dar es Salaam (118 or 61% males and 75 or 39% females) randomly selected from the Faculty of Humanities and Communications at St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT) and from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). The study used the standardized questionnaire developed under by SUNY-Buffalo's CGSE with some adaptation. Each item/variable from each questionnaire was first manually coded and entered into excel program and then analyzed by using SPSS program to generate descriptive statistics.

**Annex 2**  
**Higher Educational Profiles<sup>15</sup>:**

	Kenya	Uganda	United Republic of Tanzania
<b>Number of public universities</b>	Six	Four	Five
<b>Number of accredited private universities</b>	Thirteen	Fourteen	Thirteen
<b>Enrollment in public universities 2003/04</b>	58,016 (31% female)	46,819 (40% female)	31,771 (31 % female)
<b>Enrollment in private universities 2003/04</b>	8,021 (54% female)	21,028 (40% female)	3,516 (36% female)
<b>Gross enrollment ratio (2004)</b>	3 percent	3 percent	1 percent
<b>Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure</b>	29.2 percent	18.3 percent	No data
<b>Expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of total educational expenditure</b>	12.9 percent	11.9 percent	No data

## Kenya

*Six Public Universities:*

1. University of Nairobi
2. Kenyatta
3. Moi
4. Egerton
5. Jomo Kenyatta
6. Maseno

*Thirteen Private Accredited Universities:*

1. The University of East Africa, Baraton
2. The Catholic University of Eastern Africa
3. Daystar University
4. Scott Theological College
5. The United States International University

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<sup>15</sup> Data compiled from UNESCO Global Education Statistics (<http://stats.uis.unesco.org>), Education Sector Annual Performance Report 2005, Ugandan Ministry of Education and Sports. (<http://www.education.go.ug/Final%20ESAPR2005.htm>); Kenya Commission for Higher Education (<http://www.che.or.ke/accreditation.html#private>); Kenyan Ministry of Education (<http://www.che.or.ke/accreditation.html#private>)

6. Africa Nazarene University
7. The East Africa School of Theology
8. The Kenya Highlands Bible College
9. The Nairobi Evangelical Graduate School of Theology
10. The Nairobi International School of Theology
11. The Pan Africa Christian College
12. St. Paul's United Theological College
13. ??

#### *4 National Polytechnics*

*Enrollment in polytechnics:* 14,106 (2003)

#### *2 Technical Institutes*

*Enrollment in technical institutes:* 18,611 (2003)

## **Uganda**

#### *Four Public Universities:*

1. Makerere University
2. Mbarara University of Science and Technology
3. Kyambogo University
4. Gulu University (being established)

#### *Fourteen Licensed Private Universities:*

1. Uganda Martyrs University, Nkozi
2. Nkumba University
3. Bugema University
4. Uganda Christian University Mukono
5. Ndejje University
6. Aghakan University
7. Kampala University
8. Kampala International University
9. African Bible College University
10. Busoga University
11. Islamic University in Uganda, Mbale
12. Kumi University
13. Kabale University
14. Mountains of the Mount University

#### *Technical Colleges and Institutes:*

National Teachers Colleges  
 Uganda Colleges of Commerce  
 Uganda Technical Colleges  
 Vocational Training Institutes  
 Other Higher Education Institutes

## **United Republic of Tanzania**

### *Five Public universities:*

1. University of Dar es Salaam
  - Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (constituent college)
  - University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (constituent college)
  - Moshi University College of Cooperative and Business Studies (constituent college)
2. Sokoine University of Agriculture
3. Open University of Tanzania
4. Mzumbe University
5. State University of Zanzibar

### *Thirteen Private Universities:*

1. St. Augustine University
2. Tumaini University KCMC
3. Tumaini University Iringa College
4. Tumaini University Makumira College
5. Tumaini University Dar es Salaam College
6. University of Arusha
7. Hurbert Kairuki Memorial University
8. International medical and Technology University
9. Zanzibar University
10. University College of Education Zanzibar
11. Bugando College of Health Sciences
12. Aga Khan University
13. Mount Merus University

### *4 Technical Institutes*

*Enrollment in 2004/05 in technical institutes: 2,242*

### *18 Other Institutions*

*Enrollment in 2004/05 in other institutions: 6,222*